Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Getting back at the TSA

Many in the security community are continually annoyed with the TSA and air safety, mumbling security theater this and idiots that. Following the undies bomber incident, these mumbling turned into rumblings, and then into a "let's get back at the TSA" joking spree, which I was more than happy to jump ahead of.

AppleGeeks Lite 561
via AppleGeeks Lite 561.

And indeed, folks on the funsec mailing list had some fun with it.
phester wrote:
I've considered carrying a bag of dildoes when I fly. I imagine a conversation something like this;

TSA: What's this?!?

Me: A bunch of dildoes.

TSA: Why are you carrying a bunch of dildoes?

Me: It makes me feel safe.

TSA: How does a bunch of dildoes make you feel safe?

Me: I've been asking the same thing since they created the TSA.
This was indeed fun, and we had a good laugh. Erik Harrison replied with the often quoted TSA joke:
TSA: "Nine times out of ten, it's an electric razor but, every once and a while, it's a dildo. Of course, it's company policy never to imply ownership in the event of a dildo. We have to use the indefinite article. A dildo, never your dildo."
After a bit more fun, I responded seriously:
If it was me, I would say it was my dildo every time. It would be interesting to see their faces, but more importantly, if it's not mine, it might be a terrorist who put it in my bag. Bad idea: an exploded bag, a cavity search and 3 hours to 3 days later...
But more than the TSA not having a sense of humour, this is really about respect, and about understanding that they can take no chances with you not being serious:
It's great to joke about, but not to practice as a joke. As I said earlier, bad idea.

Don't mess with:
1. People trying to do their jobs.
2. People who are on alert for criminals and terrorists.
3. People who have the power to arrest you.
4. People who have guns to do their job.
and:
5. People who are forced to check you completely with the mere mention of a joke, as it might not be a joke.
All-in-all, we had a good time playing with this, but we should all keep in mind that regardless of what we may think of the TSA and others around the world, some jokes are just not worth the price of a cavity search -- or at the very least 10 more minutes in line.

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

New subject specific blog from me: Pathos Daily

I have been interested in human communication for a while now, be it debate and rhetoric on the one hand, or social/non-verbal psychology and persuasion on the other. I often come across links of interest, and share them with friends. Or have thoughts on the subject and share them here.

I decided that with the effort of emailing out links, I can also easily blog them. And so, I started a new blog on this subject matter, to specifically post links to interesting news stories and comic strips.

It is called Pathos Daily, and you can read it at:
http://pathosdaily.blogspot.com/

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Sunday, January 10, 2010

Funny! Mario & Luigi on Omegle: Password Social Engineering

This is a funny picture describing a chat on Omegle, which not only made me ROFL, but also teaches social engineering!

Sometimes learning about security and hacking can come from odd sources. :)



Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Friday, January 08, 2010

Putting Trojan Horses on Chips!

This is a story about a contest to put Trojan horses on chips. Very interesting from an hardware hacking perspective, as well as a trusting trust and supply chain security perspective.
5 January 2010—In November, engineering students from five top universities gathered at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU, in Brooklyn, N.Y., for the Embedded Systems Challenge. The aim was to test new attacks and defenses against an underappreciated breed of Trojan horse—embedded malware built into integrated circuits.

The winning team’s results, set to appear in journals and at conference proceedings in 2010, reveal how vulnerable many systems are to "chip attacks" The contest also demonstrated the high degree of technical sophistication required for these attacks, making it more likely that attackers will pursue specialized applications, such as sensitive military equipment or high-security financial computers. Attacking Dad’s new Windows 7 PC probably isn’t worth the extreme investment of time and money—especially when cheaper and quicker phishing and software-based malware attacks still work all too well.
Definitely worth a read!

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Wednesday, December 30, 2009

Air Travel Security: Practical Industry Suggestions From Us

I am just a security guy, as are many others who will read this. Perhaps it is time us "simple" security guys got together and write some recommendations for air travel security? Get our voice out there as an organized professional group, which can in turn lobby for our professional recommendations.

Then we can edit them, vote on them, and submit them to the government for consideration in the upcoming brouhaha of committee discussions.

Here are mine, just to get the ball rolling:

Strategic:
0. Review useless technologies which are there for beyond the security theater purposes (which do matter) and start eliminating bad projects. Your purpose in security theater was to maintain air travel and keep people calm, right?
1. An investment in better intelligence (no brainer)
2. Create a "always strip-search" list rather than just "no fly" list., so that lesser threats can be dealt with responsibly without compromising the usefulness of the no fly one. I am sure they already have one, but they should layer this rather than deal with extremes.
3. Hire better agents (education/ability... better pay). Should be a small increase per person, but it will cost a lot in total. Then again, how much do all the current b/s additions cost?
4. Yours?

Tactical:
1. Copy Israel's air security training manual for agents. Israel's tactics may not be able to scale to the US level, but the training can.
2. Stop panicking and alienating people, so they are calmer and you can more easily identify suspicious people, so that this new training is more effective. Heck, do it anyway. Send TSA agents to some workshop on being nice. Or make shifts shorter.
3. Put "human sniffer" walk-through machines in every airport, for international flights.
4. Buy the better brand of baggage screening && X-ray machines for international flights (remember the liquid issue with checking for explosives in the last scare?)
5. Some people suggested to start profiling and leave PC behind, but I'm not touching that.
6. Yours?

Some of these are very high cost. Some of these are (on scale) very low cost.
Some of these should replace other high-cost idiocies, such as creating two new mega-airports, which is sound security-wise, but will only add an hop to the threat to jump over, with the same silly tests in yet another airport, rather than add a filter. Or full-body scans which will be of limited help, and insult us all.

What are yours? Join the discussion!

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Friday, December 18, 2009

Spymaster sees Israel as world cyberwar leader

Reuters reports from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), a Tel Aviv University think tank, where Major General Amos Yadlin, IDF chief of military intelligence, spoke:

In a policy address, Major-General Amos Yadlin, chief of military intelligence, listed vulnerability to hacking among national threats that also included the Iranian nuclear project, Syria and Islamist guerrillas along the Jewish state's borders.

Yadlin said Israeli armed forces had the means to provide network security and launch cyber attacks of their own.

He further said, as mentioned in this Israeli publication, that other countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, are establishing units for cyber defense, and that Israel has soldiers and officers on the job.

In fact, just today I heard a lecture by the director of the CIA who, as is general United States policy, places cyber security on the map when discussing issues such as proliferation of nuclear weapons and international terrorism.

HaAretz, an Israeli newspaper, quotes Major-General Yaldin as saying:

"Fighting in the cyber dimension is as significant as the introduction of fighting in the aerial dimension in the early 20th century." (my translation)

If this statement is to be believed, Israel is active in cyberspace. And yet, why would Israel admit that, regardless of if it really happens?

One option is that Israel decided it needs to show that its military is on par with other militaries around the world.

"Preserving the lead in this field is especially important given the dizzying pace of change," Yadlin said.

On the surface, disclosing cyber space activity, which your enemies can develop as well, or push to develop more of, seems silly.

After all, Major-General Yadlin said:

"Cyberspace grants small countries and individuals a power that was heretofore the preserve of great states,"

As Israel, much like the Western world, is very advanced technologically, it is more reliant on computers than many of its enemies and neighbors, and is therefore more at risk from potential cyber attacks. With attacks against Israel's internet presence these last few years, it may not be a silly idea after all.

With the world becoming more aware of threats to computer systems, investment in cyber security rising and more and more security incidents being disclosed; countries around the globe invest in cyber capabilities. Indeed, Israel too, which has been under internet attacks for years, needs to buckle up and do more to combat the threats.

Major-General Yadlin also mentioned cyber attacks fit well with Israel's doctrine for military offensives (mistranslated below as defense). This bit is tricky, and I will try and read between the lines.

"I would like to point out in this esteemed forum that the cyberwarfare field fits well with the state of Israel's defense doctrine,"

While Major-General Yadlin in all probability meant something along the lines of being bold and staying ahead of the curve, as in the same sentence he also spoke of Israeli youth and innovation, mentioning how Israel is often referred to as the "start-up country":

"This is an enterprise that is entirely blue and white (Israeli) and does not rely on foreign assistance or technology. It is a field that is very well known to young Israelis, in a country that was recently crowned a 'start-up nation'."

It is possible, although unlikely, that he meant to indeed discuss Israel's defense doctrine, thus possibly speaking about deterrence in cyberspace.

Deterrence is an integral part of Israel's defense doctrine, with the goal, in broad lines, of widening the window between inevitable Arab attacks by a strong response, some would say a disproportionate one, which will score a quick and decisive victory. Hopefully deterring them from attacking again. This strategy has roots in Israel's history all the way back to Ben Gurion's time and the formation of Israel.

Deterrence on the Internet, however, is mostly nonsense. This due to inability to identify who it is actually attacking you, and then if somehow successful, if it is really them or if their computer has been taken over by yet another attacker. Is someone trying to frame another as your attacker? Is your attacker even a nation-state to begin with, rather than an organization that doesn't care about retaliation?

On the internet, you may know who your enemies are rivals are, but you may never find out who is attacking you. The Internet is perfect for plausible deniability.

If this was the thinking behind the announcement, which I'd like to think is not the case, then the strategy was copied from the United States where this silliness has been going on now for a few years. The US strategic experts have been using Mutual Deterrence (or MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction) for over 70 years now, and feel comfortable with it. Therefore, when they needed to tackle the cyber realm, they immediately started pushing for a deterrence strategy even though cyber experts have been warning about it continually.

Deterrence for the most part, doesn't work online. It is my hope Israel does not repeat the American mistake on this matter and that I am right, and Major-General Yaldin was only speaking of Israel's spirit, where commanding officers lead the charge rather than wait behind.

From a completely different perspective, cyber warfare has been recognized as a strategic weapon on par with weapons of mass destruction for at least two decades. Israel does not admit strategic capabilities such as Nuclear Weapons, if it has them. Should it admit cyber capabilities?

"The potential exists here for applying force ... capable of compromising the military controls and the economic functions of countries, without the limitations of range and location."

While cyberspace is certainly strategic, the analogy to nuclear weapons is relatively weak.

There are obvious differences between the nuclear world and the cyber world, such as with tactical cyber uses of a very targeted nature -- without collateral damage, and in international law governing the proliferation of nuclear arms, while the cyber realm is in its infancy. In fact, the United States, Russia and the United Nations arms control committee are as I write these lines engaged in early discussions on securing cyberspace, and limiting military use of this realm.

When I first heard of the speech by Major-General Yaldin, I was highly disappointed with Israel for taking this route of public disclosure. Now, I am not so sure.

Disclosing that Israel is ready to defend itself and potentially engage its enemies in cyberspace right along-side the physical world, certainly has merit considering recent world events such as the attacks against Estonia and Georgia. I am just left wondering if this indeed discloses a real capability, or is just public relations.

I can personally attest from my years of defending Israel's internet, that Israel is under constant attack in cyberspace, and this intensifies whenever political tensions mount.

"At times it would seem," said Major-General Yaldin, "that our enemies would like to give a special award to Western companies whose products can be bought off-the-shelf at a reasonable price." (my translation)

Regardless, putting cyber security on the agenda along-side with Iranian nuclear weapons, Syria and Islamist guerrillas, is a step in the right direction to defending against the threats of cyberspace.

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.


Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Thursday, November 26, 2009

Was the ClimateGate Hacker Justified? Join the Debate!

A few days ago a story broke where someone hacked into a global warming research institute and stole all emails from the past 10 years, proving a conspiracy.

In the vast amount of emails stolen, some emails were also found with clear-cut lies, showing how some scientists conspired to deceive in scientific research about data that did not fit their agenda of proving global warming.

I am opening the subject for debate on the debate mailing list. It is a fascinating topic covering several subjects such as 'does the end justify the means?', 'irresponsible disclosure of personal data', 'is it justifiable to break the law?' and 'civil disobedience and the hackers' role in keeping society honest'.

Here are some possible questions to get the wheels rolling:

- Is the action taken by the hacker legal, ethical, and/or moral? Was the action justifiable?

- Do you believe the harm done as a result is justified for the good (disclosure) that came out of it?

- Can this be treated as civil disobedience?

For background, check out this story:
http://www.examiner.com/x-25061-Climate-Change-Examiner~y2009m11d20-ClimateGate--Climate-centers-server-hacked-revealing-documents-and-emails

Another source:
http://noconsensus.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/leaked-foia-files-62-mb-of-gold/


Join the debate mailing list, now! :)
http://whitestar.linuxbox.org/mailman/listinfo/debate

Please state your opinions openly, and let's discuss!

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Announcement: Critical Internet Infrastructure WG is now open to public participation

ISOTF Critical Internet Infrastructure WG is now open to public participation.

The group holds top experts on internet technology, critical infrastructure, and internet governance, from around the globe.

Together, we discuss definitions, problems, challenges and solutions in securing and assuring the reliability of the global internet infrastructure, which is critical infrastructure for a growing number of nations, corporations and indeed, individuals -- world wide.

The group started as a closed and private forum, to discuss technical and operational risks, as other venues limited discussion of critical internet resources to politically charged subjects such ascontrol of ICANN and ARIN, thus overshadowing other important aspects.

As of November 18th 2009, the list is open for public access, to advance public awareness of the issues, and bring new talent on board.

The group is hosted by the ISOTF, but is governed by members.

Note: SCADA, network operations, and other related issues should be discussed in the appropriate forums, elsewhere. This group deals with the internet.

To subscribe:
http://isotf.org/mailman/listinfo/cii

Gadi Evron for ISOTF-CII-WG.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Friday, November 13, 2009

China, is it our cyber defense red herring?

There are thousands of articles perpetuating the claim that China is out to get us on the Internet. And yet, all these discussions are begging the question, is it China attacking? Also, are they even the "usual suspects"?

While I can point to real facts of China making active use of information warfare, cyber warfare, or whatever else you choose to call it (such as the release of 0 days being patched by Microsoft
and originally reported by the Taiwanese government, search Microsoft's site), I can also point to Germany (intelligence Trojan horse), the US (The Farewell Dossier) and other countries such
as North Korea (without much detail, so questioned).

We have a failing, that even as experts we see an IP source in China for an attack, and as it is popular, and we are still used to think in the physical world, jump to the conclusion the actor is from China. The actor is often from the US, Eastern Europe, Russia, Brazil, and many other countries. That in turn does not mean these actors are then sponsored by these countries. Information warfare is about covertness, not about being loud. The Internet is perfect for plausible deniability, as I've learned when writing the postmortem analysis of the 2007 attacks against Estonia, for the Estonian CERT.

The Chinese know more about the uses of being covert than any of the rest of us, in their strategy, their actions, and their history. If they are being so indiscreet it is for a specific reason, perhaps as a smoke-screen, or indeed, they are not doing it to begin with.

I am not saying the Chinese government does not attack, I am saying naming them continually is nothing but a baseless red herring, and an easy scape-goat we have all grown used to. Thus, blaming China by itself has become acceptable just because people did it often enough. The story of Ethos manufacturing itself.

Malicious computers in China are a problem we can't and shouldn't deny. However, continually claiming China is the Big Bad and attributing every attack to them, is beyond ridiculous. Nothing to see here, move along.

Then again, maybe if we keep saying it's the Chinese with every attack we see, they will get some ideas and make it true for us. It may eventually prove true, but our current proof is based mainly on people claiming it in the past. We are better than this.

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Friday, October 30, 2009

Cyber War and Cyber Deterrence

A few days ago a Google Alert on my name let me know that I was referenced in a paper from RAND. I have high appreciation for RAND's work, so naturally I went to look.

The work by one Martin Libicki discusses cyber war and cyber deterrence. He is against the silly notion, much like I am.

I've grown so tired of repeating "these discussions the past two years in US defense circles are just ... stupid." I am happy that someone else, as articulate as Libicki, joined our side of the debate. Just because US experts are so used to deterrence as a strategy after 70 years, does not mean it fits the bill with the Internet. In fact, it is extreme folly.

I don't agree with everything Libicki says, but I do agree with him on this matter.

However...
Unlike many, I believe offensive capabilities are critical for any nation nowadays, but that thinking it would assist in defense is delusional.

Libicki's actual RAND paper can be found here:
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG877.pdf

Maybe now I can finally write a paper I want to write, on when deterrence actually does work on the Internet. There are cases where it does, but raising these before now would have muddied the water.

I also plan to be more vocal in the debate in the coming months, and pull out of the drawer some articles I wrote on the subject, for when it warms up and they can make a difference.

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Tuesday, September 29, 2009

Medical Vaccines as an Analogy to Information Security

In the information security field, we often encounter an ethical dilemma. Should information become public, so that people can protect themselves, or better decide how to do so. Or should it remain secret so that larger harm is prevented? The world of Vaccines shows us an image of how medical professionals deal with the issue.

I recently wrote a blog post on an unrelated subject, vaccines and their risks. I have been gathering information on whether they are safe for some time now.

While they are in fact, in the vast majority of cases, safe, there is no easily available information online as to the risks associated with vaccination. Most of this data, therefore, can be found in scare-monger websites, spreading fear, uncertainty and doubt.

Whatever reason vaccine professionals have to take the party-line, we can assume one reason they do not wish public debate to avoid risk of more people not vaccinating, potentially increasing the death-toll and causing epidemics.

The similarities don't end there, and it truly is fascinating. For example the World Health Organization (WHO) monitors disease globally, detects new epidemics and responds accordingly, and thus monitoring the success of vaccines as well.

An interesting anecdote is on global risk analysis. How regulation trumps personal liberties world-wide in vaccination programs for new-born babies, as the risk of epidemics outweighs the infringement. Some people claim that this is no longer the case, and that these programs need to be reexamined. They seem to be wrong, but information is not easily available online. It is interesting to note, as once successful, even if it was no longer helpful I very much doubt society would easily change in this regard, much like I am sure it was difficult to initiate this program to begin with.

I doubt such regulation will happen in information security, but a common stance such as vaccine developers and medical doctors have on emerging threats could be highly beneficial to our field, when approaching the public.

Many interesting strategic and psychological lessons can be learned by examining this field, when compared to information security.

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron

Friday, September 11, 2009

Lessons I Learned from Cyber Crime, an Article Series

I have been slow on updating this blog due to blogging on Dark Reading. I will make amends and start updating here more often. I will also start to cover my more interesting blogs on Dark Reading, here. You can also read my personal blog where I write about things I find interesting, or funny.

A few months ago I wrote a short series on some of the lessons I learned from the world of security and cyber crime. About systems and networks, people and communities, and finally, projects and making things happen, the first one begins with:
"The history of anti-spam teaches us about half-baked ideas and how people succeeded or failed to implement them. The analogy of evolution, while limited, demonstrates how reactionary solutions can achieve strategic goals before they are made obsolete by countermeasures.

How do you herd cats? In a series of blogs starting today, I'll explore the history of fighting cybercrime and how and why certain solutions worked while others failed, how we can recreate success, and what lessons we can distill to build business solutions, affect change in communities -- and even fight terrorism."
The three posts in question, are:

1. Lessons From Fighting Cybercrime
"... Criminals were forced to evolve in a desirable direction, which is a victory on its own. Evolution in capabilities occurs to circumvent security measures. By limiting the spammers' options they evolved to a technological battleground where we have more control."
2. Lessons From Fighting Cybercrime, Part 2

"... It enumerates ways by which "new" and "amazing" suggestions on solving the spam problem go wrong... If only "everyone" (or most people) used their solution or "forced users" to act counter intuitively (and similar truisms), spam would be "gone". It is well worth a read.

Trying to map how some solutions work while others can't even get off the ground and seeing how communities and social systems change is fascinating. The examples above and many other lessons of fighting cybercrime are illuminating. Especially when we consider they are mostly derived from failures of technical solutions to solve a human problem, a common design fallacy this day and age."

3. Cybercriminals: More Obvious Than They Think?
  • "...Let me pose it this way: It's a hot summer day, and you're drinking a beer at the beach. People are having fun and relaxing. Suddenly, you see a person wearing an heavy coat. Is this suspicious?"
  • "... Encryption is a great tool, but it also draws attention to you for using it. In your organization, how likely is an attacker to identify important resources just by watching for encrypted traffic? In some cases, it may be better to stay obscure, in the background as noise, than to use encryption. If the malware sample is new and therefore undetected by antivirus, then the same unfortunately applies to malware authors."
I hope you find these posts interesting. Do share your thoughts with me. Any anecdote, epiphany or even just an insight from your own experience will be appreciated.

Gadi Evron,
ge@linuxbox.org.

Follow me on twitter! http://twitter.com/gadievron